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    September 18

    Lonelygirl15: Prank, Art or Both

    Lonelygirl15: Prank, Art or Both

    Grant Steinfeld

    OFF CAMERA Jessica Rose, would-be actress, and Mesh Flinders, would-be artist.

    September 17, 2006

    Lonelygirl15: Prank, Art or Both

    By TOM ZELLER Jr.

    THE online video diaries of Lonelygirl15, a plucky, home-schooled 16-year-old who speaks in puzzles and harrumphs, Lolita-like, at the strict religious sway of her cultish parents, draws hundreds of thousands of viewers every week. It is the most subscribed-to channel on the video-sharing Web site YouTube.com.

    Many of those subscribers have always suspected that Lonelygirl15 was a fiction. Some subscribed only to join the Internet posse dedicated to proving her so — a nearly four-month enterprise that ended last week, when Lonelygirl15 was identified as Jessica Rose, a 19-year-old actress originally from New Zealand.

    Now living in California, Ms. Rose admitted that she had simply answered an ad posted online at Craigslist by Mesh Flinders and Miles Beckett, two aspiring and underfinanced filmmakers with a "new art form" in mind, they said.

    But while the Internet may provide a new playground for artists, whether the Lonelygirl videos qualify as art is an open question.

    "For people who want to tell compelling stories, and to have the freedom to depart from formulas and focus groups at a risk that's acceptable, since the budget is low, the Internet offers an unparalleled canvas," said Jonathan Zittrain, a founder of the Berkman Center for Internet and Society at Harvard Law School and a professor of Internet governance and regulation at Oxford.

    This is well underway with popular Web diarists like Gary Benchley, a struggling rock 'n' roll wannabe who proved to be the fictional creation of the Brooklyn writer Paul Ford, or even alternate-reality games like ABC's "Lost Experience," a spinoff of the television show, where the real world and the show's storyline overlap.

    "Still, on the Internet as with Hollywood," Mr. Zittrain added, "the true standouts will require some measure of genius. There's no substitute for old-fashioned good acting with a dash of mystery, with clues well proportioned to keep fans busy without revealing too much at once."

    That's what the creators of Lonelygirl15 tried to do with their attempt at a "false document" — a literary coinage attributed to the American poet and critic Kenneth Rexroth. It refers to a narrative device meant to bring heightened authenticity to a work of fiction. Examples range from Daniel Defoe's account of "Robinson Crusoe," which the author claimed to have only edited, to Orson Welles's famous radio adaptation of "War of the Worlds," which caused a national panic.

    "There is nothing new about the simulations of Lonelygirl15 except the technology," said the author E. L. Doctorow, whose own novels are well known for manipulating the tensions between reality and invention by placing historical figures and circumstances alongside fictional ones. "There will be more and more of this genre blurring and some genuine art could come out of it."

    And what of Lonelygirl? Can it be called a false document, and thus gain some credibility as a work of art?

    "If the author wants to truly fool his or her audience, it's not a false document," said Eileen Pollack, an English professor at the University of Michigan. "If the intent is just to say 'gotcha,' it's a prank."

    The author of a true false document, Ms. Pollack said, "wants the audience to figure out at some point that it's being had, with the object of making that audience think about the nature of the reality."

    Ms. Pollack cited the 1984 mockumentary "This Is Spinal Tap," which purported to tell the comeback tale of a washed-up heavy metal band. The film, and accompanying band tour, were so deadpan that some people would be forgiven for thinking that Spinal Tap was a real group. And, along the way, Ms. Pollack said, their false document highlighted the manufactured nature of popular music.

    She also pointed to "The Blair Witch Project," the 1999 low-budget horror movie stitched together from the supposedly found footage of three amateur filmmakers gone missing in the dark woods. The movie was a statement about overreliance on special effects in horror films.

    "They asked the question, 'can anyone really be scared by that anymore?' " Ms. Pollack said.

    By these criteria, she argued, Lonelygirl didn't measure up — although students in her seminar "False Documents," who discussed the topic of Lonelygirl last week, largely disagreed, she said.

    "They were much more willing to grant that something could just be very well done and create a buzz and that's O.K.," she said.

    Still, Mike Monello, a founder of Haxan Films, which created "The Blair Witch Project," suggested that the creators of Lonelygirl — who have promised to continue the yarn — need to get down to the business of storytelling.

    "I'd love to see them hold onto a significant portion of their audience by entertaining them with the Lonelygirl15 story under complete transparency," Mr. Monello said. "Until they do that, however, they haven't so much created a new art form as executed a wonderful hoax."


    Marie Antoinette, out of the closet.

    Marie Antoinette, out of the closet.





    DRESSED FOR EXCESS
    by JUDITH THURMAN
    Marie Antoinette, out of the closet.
    Issue of 2006-09-25
    Posted 2006-09-18

    Marie Antoinette, the ex-Queen of France, was thirty-seven when she was taken from her cell in the Conciergerie, the fourteenth-century fortress on the Île de la Cité, and paraded in an open oxcart to the scaffold in the Place de la Révolution, a mile away. Some of the onlookers in the vast crowd lining the route that morning, on October 16, 1793, may have been among those screaming obscenities at her in 1789, when they marched with pikes on Versailles; or axed their way, in 1792, into her apartment in the Tuileries, where they spent their fury on her mirrors and closets; or waved the severed head of her friend and look-alike, the lovely Princesse de Lamballe, on a halberd outside her window. But now they observed an eerie silence.

    Her husband, Louis XVI, who lost his title when the monarchy was abolished, had been guillotined nine months earlier, though he was spared the indignity of riding in a tumbrel with bound hands. The Jacobin extremists then seized her son. The eight-year-old Louis Charles—Louis XVII to royalists—had clung to her skirts and was pulled off. As part of his reëducation, his captors plied him with alcohol between beatings and taught him the "Marseillaise," which he sang with a heartbreaking swagger, wearing the red bonnet of a sansculotte. He testified that she had molested him, and his evidence was presented at her brief show trial for treason and moral turpitude. He died two years later, alone in a dungeon.

    No other queen, except perhaps Cleopatra, was more intent than Marie Antoinette on dressing for history. While her instincts for self-display had worked more toward her undoing than her glory, they served her a last time. The mourning outfit she had worn day and night since her husband's death, in defiance of a Jacobin edict against black (a color symbolic of monarchist sympathies), had grown increasingly shabby. But, knowing that she would need to make a final and unforgettable impression—at her execution—she had managed to acquire a pristine chemise, petticoat, morning dress, and bonnet, all in white.

    Early on the day of her death, Marie Antoinette arose from a few sleepless hours on her straw pallet and began her toilette. At dawn, the Jacobins' chief executioner, Citizen Sanson, arrived to cut off her hair. It had turned white in the course of a few days in June of 1791, during the captive royal family's ill-conceived flight to Varennes, which had ended with their recapture. The artist Jacques-Louis David, a radical member of the National Convention, watched the death march from a window, and what he perceived as the "arrogance" of the traitor's mien particularly incensed him. He sketched a hasty portrait of a wasted crone with a scornful grimace and a ramrod spine. Her dress looks like a shroud.

    The former Queen had been denied a priest of her choice (one of the dissidents who had refused to swear an oath of loyalty to the Revolution), so she mounted the scaffold alone and apologized to Sanson for stepping on his toe. After he released the blade, he exhibited the head, as was customary, and the crowd, shaken from its trance, roared, "Vive la République! " The remains were then taken to a cemetery off the Rue d'Anjou, where the bodies of the King and of his Swiss Guard—who were butchered orgiastically at the Tuileries, with other royal retainers—had been buried, the latter in a trench. The gravediggers, as Antonia Fraser writes in her biography "Marie Antoinette: The Journey" (2001), were taking a lunch break, so they left the Queen's head and body lying on the grass, giving a young sculptor—Marie Grosholtz, who later became Madame Tussaud—an opportunity to take a wax imprint for a death mask. In 1815, a year after the Bourbon monarchy was restored, Louis XVIII, the King's perfidious younger brother (who had married his son to Marie Antoinette's only surviving child, Marie Thérèse), exhumed the relics and had them reburied in state, at the Cathedral of St. Denis. Chateaubriand was present at the ceremony, and he claimed to have recognized the head immediately, Fraser writes, "by the special shape of the Queen's mouth, recalling that dazzling smile she had given him at Versailles." But all that was left, besides a skull, some hair, and the nostalgia of a Romantic, were two garters, in perfect condition.


    Marie Antoinette is periodically disinterred in order to be reviled or celebrated or, as in recent years, to help sell clothes, as she did when she was queen. This fall, her latest avatar, Kirsten Dunst, looking dewy and regal, is ubiquitous in magazines promoting a new film biography directed by Sofia Coppola and based on Fraser's life. Coppola herself is a fashion celebrity and muse, who helps to publicize the work of designer friends by wearing it with the teasing glamour of a jaded virgin playing dress-up in her mother's clothes. She has always been drawn to beautiful, trapped girls, who belong to a generation too cynical to unite in rebellion and too cool to unite in conformity. You can see why she thought that the "teen Queen"—a hostage to appearances—would make a good subject. But, rather than play to her forte for impiety, she and an ensemble of virtuoso technicians have produced—despite the odd, postmodern wink—a sanitized, old-fashioned costume picture.

    Vogue predicts that the movie "will have a considerable impact on fashion for years to come," though the shape of that impact is a bit hard to imagine, like Chateaubriand's vision of the smile. Every new runway season seems to recapitulate some version of the artificial face-off between decadent royalism and radical chic, and has done so for about twenty years. But perhaps people who live for fashion worship Marie Antoinette precisely because she represents a time when one had to take sides, and dressing not only defined them—it was a matter of survival.


    Few tyrants have aroused more visceral hatred than Marie Antoinette, an ordinary woman whose life is infinitely more complex than she was. That hatred, which is usually chalked up to the sentiments expressed in a sentence she never uttered, "Let them eat cake," has become part of her mystique. Her downfall—a cautionary tale for politicians out of touch with their base—began almost the moment she arrived at Versailles, as a fourteen-year-old dauphine who recklessly decided to emancipate herself from the constraints of court protocol and, at the same time, to impress the courtiers she was offending with a display of prestige she didn't possess.

    Marie Antoinette's prestige depended principally on one attribute—her fertility—and her shy, obese, fifteen-year-old bridegroom wouldn't deflower her (or at least finish the job) for seven years. Louis XVI is, like his wife, something of a cipher, but prolonged exposure to her hectic glamour begins to make his dreariness appealing. He spent his leisure, which was considerable, turning locks on a private forge (he had a touching faith in the virtue of useful labor), when he wasn't hunting in the forest, and in that respect—his passion for the chase—he couldn't have been a stranger to desire. He was less of a reactionary than many of his courtiers, including the Queen; he was, to certain modern eyes, admirable in his antiheroic distaste for violence and martial preening; he understood that the appalling tax code needed reform; yet he was passive and befuddled.

    On numerous occasions, and as tactfully as possible, Marie Antoinette brought up the subject of "living in the intimacy" required of their vows, as did his physicians, and Louis made promises to act that he couldn't keep. In 1777, two and a half years into his kingship, he finally managed the feat. But the bizarre impasse was resolved only when Marie Antoinette's older brother, the brusque and plainspoken Emperor Joseph II of Austria, arrived at Versailles to have a frank talk with his sister about her spendthrift ways, and with the bumbling dynast about his obligations. Joseph was filled with contempt at the discovery, he wrote to his cadet, Archduke Leopold, in Vienna, that the King "has strong, perfectly satisfactory erections; he introduces his member, stays there without moving for about two minutes, withdraws without ejaculating but still erect, and bids goodnight." If he had been there, he swore, he would have had Louis whipped "so that he would have come out of sheer rage like a donkey."

    Apart from the humiliation of having her bedsheets checked for blood or "emissions," and her periods reported on by ambassadors to every court in Europe, the ordeal of Marie Antoinette's prolonged virginity trapped her in a perilous limbo. As long as an annulment was possible, she had to cultivate an "appearance of credit" with the King, as she explained to her brother. Cultivating the appearance of virtue might have been a more politic strategy, but she chose, instead, to model her style and behavior on those of a royal paramour. The wives of Louis XIV and Louis XV had both been pious and obscure wallflowers, which is precisely what the French expected from a good queen. Their husbands' chief favorites, however—Mesdames de Montespan, de Pompadour, and du Barry (a ravishing former prostitute with appalling manners who was still plying her trade with the old Louis XV when Antoinette arrived at court)—were glittering cynosures whose power no one dared to ignore. So the scorned virgin began to upgrade her fictitious "credit" by acquiring the flamboyant wardrobe of a kept woman (lest the point be lost, she appeared at one of her masked balls as Gabrielle d'Estrées, the Renaissance mistress of Henri IV, wearing a cloud of silver-spangled white gauze, a diamond stomacher and girdle, and a skirt swagged with gold fringe that was pinned up by more diamonds), as well as a private real-estate portfolio of incalculable worth, including the Petit Trianon, which was built for Pompadour, and Saint-Cloud, an asset of the Crown, which she had transferred to her name.

    In 1774, Louis XV, the Dauphin's grandfather, died suddenly of smallpox, at sixty-four. "God help us," nineteen-year-old Louis XVI exclaimed, "for we are too young to reign." Shortly after his coronation, a year later, at which the Queen made herself particularly conspicuous in an embroidered gown encrusted with sapphires and a towering ziggurat of powdered hair, she had her portrait painted for her mother. When the Empress Maria Theresa received it, she was aghast. "No, this is not the portrait of a queen of France," she wrote back. "This is the portrait of an actress!"

    The staggering expenses that Marie Antoinette's quixotic game plan incurred were paid for by levies on the Third Estate. Her budget overruns on an annual clothing allowance of about $3.6 million in current spending power were, in some years, more than double. Sometimes the King made up the difference, and occasionally the Queen made a propitiatory gesture of economy—she once refused a parure on the ground that the Navy could use a new battleship. But her chronic debt was one source of the epithet Madame Déficit, the other being her expedience as a scapegoat for enemies on both the right and the left. The former saw her as an insidious foreign agent—l'Autrichienne (the epithet contains a pun on the word for "bitch," chienne)—and decried her corrupting influence on the countless Frenchwomen who aspired to her chic.

    The republicans saw Marie Antoinette as the insatiable parasite who embodied all the evils of her regime, but one should note that the millions she funnelled to her architects, gardeners, entertainers, caterers, cobblers, perfumers, decorators, coiffeurs, and—most egregiously—dressmakers wouldn't have been sufficient to compensate for the disastrous wars and centuries of corruption and inequity that were responsible for the country's bankruptcy. As a symptom, however, the inventory of her follies was hard to ignore. (Fraser asks one to forgive, if not thank, the prodigal Queen for helping to create "things of great delight," and she cites the boudoir at Fontainebleau as the "supreme example.") A gown or headdress from Marie Antoinette's favorite marchande de mode, Rose Bertin, could easily cost twenty times what a skilled worker earned in a year, and if he wanted to see where his taxes went he could visit the Queen's wardrobe—it was open to the public.

    Until the end, the ferocious hatred of the people didn't much perturb Marie Antoinette. She had told her mother, years before, that the French were "thoughtless in character but not bad; pens and tongues say many things that do not come from the heart." She seems to have thought of her own heart as pure: that of an enlightened queen who provided dowries for indigent maidens; imported peasant playmates for her children to teach them humility; adopted the orphan of a chambermaid; supported artists, like her music teacher Gluck and his protégé Salieri; and paid homage to the ideals of Rousseau by building an enchanting, faux-rustic village—the Hameau—where she and her ladies liked to dress in exorbitantly simple lawn frocks known as gaulles, set off by a ribbon sash and a straw hat.

    A pure heart, however, does not entirely rule out an adulterous love affair. It isn't certain (though it seems likely, Fraser thinks) that the Queen consummated her lifelong romance with Count Axel Fersen, a Swedish officer of immense charm and wealth who fought with the French forces in America, and who, in the royal triangle (if that's what it was), played Mars to Louis's Vulcan. He had met the Dauphine one night by chance in the days when she and her ladies (noble age-mates who, a contemporary wrote, "loved pleasure and hated restraint; laughed at everything, even the tattle about their own reputations; and recognized no law save the necessity of spending their lives in gaiety") would throw a hooded cloak over their panniers, escape to Paris, and mingle with masked strangers of mixed estate at the opera balls. The affair probably began only once the King had managed to make Antoinette "a real wife," but it continued sporadically whenever Fersen's military and diplomatic missions brought him to Versailles. The King was fond of his gallant company, and Fersen proved his devotion, if not his competence, by helping to orchestrate the flight to Varennes.

    But, apart from her profligate and imprudent greed, there was nothing vicious about Marie Antoinette. She never so much as dreamed of the atrocities, including incest and pedophilia, attributed to her as the "French Messalina" and the "Austrian whore." By the standards of Versailles (which were admittedly deplorable), she was a loyal consort, a besotted mother, and a virtuous enough wife. Nor did the French people entirely begrudge the Queen her lavish toilettes. She was expected, indeed required, to make a patriotic public display of support for the luxury trades, particularly silk weaving, an important sector of the economy. But Marie Antoinette never understood that her splendor was a form of livery, and that with it came hieratic duties and sacrifices. She could not have been killed had she not first been deconsecrated, and she had unwittingly colluded in her own deconsecration by asserting her divine right to the one privilege no deified being can exercise with impunity. That, as she put it to her mother, was "to be myself."


    Maria Theresa would have preferred to trade one of her older girls to France, an untested ally, but one was pockmarked and the others were married or dead. Though Antoinette, like her fiancé, was a dynastic spare (until his father and two brothers died prematurely, Louis had been fourth in line), beauty strengthened her hand. She was, according to her lady of the bedchamber and biographer, Madame Campan, a lithe and blue-eyed ash blonde "bursting with freshness," who gave the picky French little to complain of. Even her detractors admired her majestic carriage and peerless complexion. Her flat chest initially caused a disgruntled murmur, but two months before the marriage the Empress was pleased to inform the King's envoy that her daughter had "become a woman." They were both confident that once she was a wife with a busy womb the bosom would fill out.

    The "handover" (remise) of a dauphine was a ritual not unlike a real-estate closing, with a final inspection attended by representatives for each party to the sale. The initial report, however, had flagged some minor flaws that needed correction. So the Parisian dentist who invented braces was imported to straighten the archducal teeth; a dancing master taught Antoinette the distinctive, gliding shuffle of court ladies; and a French coiffeur, M. Larsenneur, artfully dissembled her unfashionably high forehead and the bald spots at her hairline. The rather more glaring bald spots in her culture and education were confided for repair to the worldly Abbé de Vermond, who did what he could with a lazy pupil who had been both spoiled and neglected.

    Once the makeover was complete, and the frugal Empress had stoically ponied up four hundred thousand livres (the yearly income of a great nobleman) for a trousseau worthy of her new in-laws, the Dauphine and her entourage set off for France. Envoys of Louis XV greeted her at the border, where she entered a pavilion built for the remise on a riverine island that straddled the frontier of the two kingdoms. As a driving rainstorm rattled the flimsy roof, and the future Queen digested the import of a tapestry that depicted Medea slaughtering her children, her Austrian retinue solemnly stripped her before all assembled and bundled up the clothes and possessions, including her pug, named Mops, that were tainted with her foreignness. Weeping and shivering, she became Crown property at the moment that her new ladies redressed her.


    Marie Antoinette was twice handed over: first to produce the legitimate heir to an ossified monarchy, then to help legitimatize the fanatics who abolished it. A scholar of the eighteenth century, Pierre Saint-Amand, sums up her life between those brackets as "a series of costumed events." That is a fair description of Coppola's film, and also of the premise of a new biography, "Queen of Fashion: What Marie Antoinette Wore to the Revolution" (Holt; $27.50), by Caroline Weber, a professor at Barnard. Her subtitle suggests how tempting it is even for a serious historian to lark on her subject's principal obsession. In the gloriously witty age of esprit, the Queen chose to—or perhaps could only—express herself in the hyper-exclamatory prose of (as Weber puts it) her "fashion statements." It is always gratifying to discover how much a fashion statement can mean, and Weber's account of the transition from the ancien régime to the Republic from a sartorial point of view is a perceptive work of scholarship that helps, in a way, to explain the transcendent importance of fashion to French culture.

    But was Marie Antoinette really a spirited rebel challenging "the oppressive cultural strictures and harsh political animosities that beset her . . . by turning her clothes and other accoutrements into defiant expressions of autonomy and prestige"? Many of her contemporaries—and not only the libellous pamphleteers and pornographers—wouldn't have agreed. "To be the most à la mode woman alive," the Comtesse de Boigne wrote, "seemed to [the Queen] to be the most desirable thing imaginable." One might also argue that what strikes a modern academic as proto-feminist self-"empowerment" also bears a suspicious resemblance to the posturing of a willful teen-ager who breaks the rules, ignores her mother's nagging, and does as she pleases to be thought cool.


    Sometime in the mid-seventeen-seventies, a young perfumer named Jean-Louis Fargeon, who had recently immigrated to Paris from his native Montpellier and taken over a well-established shop on the Rue du Roule, was invited to present samples of his work to Madame du Barry. Fargeon came from a family of artisans, and had recently graduated from journeyman to master. But he was also a student of the Enlightenment who had been deeply moved by Rousseau's assertion that the nose is the door to the soul. The fame of his products—not only scents and oils but cosmetics, powders, pomades, hair dyes, and such dainty novelties as a tongue-scraper—attracted the Queen's attention. Elisabeth de Feydeau, a French professor (with a doctorate in "the history of perfume" from the Sorbonne—Vive la France! ), tells the story of their relations in "A Scented Palace: The Secret History of Marie Antoinette's Perfumer" (Tauris; $26.95), a sparely written and subtly distilled life. Fargeon's impressions of Marie Antoinette are particularly compelling, in part because of their intimacy and his keen senses, but in part because he is a witness who, despite a vocation that depended almost entirely on an aristocratic clientele, believed ardently in the ideals of the Revolution.

    The perfumer was shocked by his first visit to the palace for some of the reasons it must also have shocked Marie Antoinette, who had grown up in a court and a family where impeccable hygiene was an article of faith. Not only did courtiers at Versailles look embalmed behind their masks of white powder and rouge but the many who bathed only once a year smelled like corpses. The filthy halls and courtyards stank of the excrement from humans and pets; dead cats floated in stagnant water; and a butcher plied his trade—gutting and roasting pigs—at the entrance to the ministers' wing. But Fargeon was equally struck by the arcane ritual of the Queen's lever, when, having proved himself, he was given the privilege of attending it. Madame Campan, in her memoirs, describes the bathing-and-dressing ceremony as "a masterpiece of etiquette," though the young Dauphine quickly got bored and exasperated at being fetishized by a tribal cult that required her to stand naked and impassive while waiting for an exalted pit crew to coördinate the task of passing a shift. "It's odious! What a bother!" she had exclaimed in an outburst so sacrilegious that it became immortal. She eventually found a way around the bother: she invited Bertin to dress her, and, since her ladies-in-waiting—daughters of the Crusades—refused to share the honor with a former shop clerk, they withdrew.

    Fargeon often collaborated on scented accessories with the earthy Bertin—a genius who not only earned but invented her place in history as a political eminence whom her detractors called the Minister of Fashion. She was the architect of the famous pouf, and Léonard—the royal hairdresser ("the personification," de Feydeau writes, "of one of the little, beribboned marquises Molière used to make fun of")—was its engineer. This amusingly freakish coiffure became the rage all over Europe, and, like most of the Queen's fashion fantasias, it proved particularly ruinous to her plebeian imitators, who, it was said, sacrificed their dowries on the altar of the Austrian's frivolity, and thus their chances of marriage, then turned to rich protectors to take up the slack, so in the end—the omega of such arguments—the French birth rate suffered.

    The pouf was a cross between a topiary and a Christmas tree, and each creation, about a yard high, had a sentimental or political theme, depending on the wearer and the occasion. It started with a wire form that Léonard padded with wool, cloth, horsehair, and gauze, interweaving the client's tresses with fake hair. When the edifice had been well stiffened with pomade and dusted with powder (vermin were fond of both, so fashionable ladies carried long-handled head-scratchers), it was ready to be trimmed with its defining scene. Ships, barnyards, vegetables, battles, nativities, and even a husband's infidelities were some of the themes. Weber calls the poufs "personalized mobile billboards," and the Queen wore a pouf à l'inoculation to publicize her triumph in persuading the King to be vaccinated against smallpox. Perched in the hairdo was a serpent in an olive tree (symbols of wisdom and Aesculapius), behind which rose the golden sun of enlightenment.


    One of Fargeon's last interviews with the Queen took place in the Tuileries, in 1791. She had summoned him for an urgent matter, "greeted him kindly," de Feydeau writes, "and asked him what he, as a bourgeois of Paris, thought of the events." He had the tact to parry the question, but the first thing he noticed was the scent of a perfume he had created for her in happier days. They had walked along a path outside the Trianon, and she had asked him for two essences: one for "an elegant and virile man," and the other, an elixir of the Trianon itself, "so that she could carry it wherever she went." But now he realized with dismay that the scent of the Trianon had gone off.

    Marie Antoinette was, in fact, planning her flight to Varennes, and she wanted Fargeon to restock her enormous toilet case for the journey. She had already seen to the fitting out of an impractically huge plush-lined carriage, loaded with as many amenities—a dining table, commodes, cooking equipment—as a Winnebago; and she had let herself be distracted from more salient preoccupations by fussing with Bertin over a luxurious new wardrobe, which distressed Madame Campan, because "that seemed useless and even dangerous to me, and I pointed out that the Queen of France will find chemises and dresses everywhere." But, de Feydeau continues, Marie Antoinette "could not conceive of going without her coiffeur, so Léonard was informed. He was to bring the coffer carrying the Queen's diamonds and to alert the horse relays of the approach of the fugitives." His grandiose bungling helped to betray the plot.

    Fargeon had been stirred, in 1789, by the Tennis Court Oath, and its promise of a new order. Though the vitriol aimed at the Queen distressed him, he was more of a republican than his wife, who fainted when she heard drunks in the Rue de Roule singing one of the more vile revolutionary songs. Fargeon explained the paradox of his feelings. Marie Antoinette, he said, was kind and bountiful to individuals, and nothing like her caricatures. Yet, as de Feydeau puts it, "her subjects were creatures of fiction to her." One had to distinguish between the woman and the Queen, he concluded, as "every monarchy was, by nature, tyrannical." This was his paraphrase of Saint-Just's famous dictum: "No one reigns innocently." But what was true of the Queen was also true of her alchemist. He recognized the humanity of Marie Antoinette but categorically despised a whole class.

    I can't help thinking of Marie Antoinette as a prototype for Emma Bovary, another naïve young beauty who marries a boorish glutton, equally naïve, and lets herself be seduced by a marchand de mode. The Bovarys, too, were a couple with no qualities beyond the ordinary, who were doomed to an extraordinary disgrace, and both stories have a brutal ending in which no justice is served. That absence of catharsis marks the point at which tragedy loses its exaltation and becomes modern—not a tale foretold about the death of kings but the story of a futile downfall that might have been averted. And it was left to Flaubert to democratize the wisdom of Saint-Just. His works insist that no one is human innocently.


    NASA


    Photo
    AP
    Mon Sep 18, 11:47 AM ET

    In this image from NASA TV, Russian cosmonaut Pavel Vinogradov works in the Unity Laboratory of the International Space Station,Monday, Sept. 18, 2006. The space station astronauts pulled an alarm and donned protective gear Monday after smelling a foul odor that turned out to be a harmful chemical leaking from an oxygen vent. (AP Photo/NASA TV)

     Astronauts inspect shuttle one last time

    By MIKE SCHNEIDER, Associated Press Writer2 hours, 5 minutes ago

    Atlantis' astronauts gave the ship's wings and nose one last inspection Monday with a remotely operated TV camera and laser, and NASA said there appeared to be no damage that would prevent the shuttle from coming home.

    Atlantis and its six crew members are set to touch down early Wednesday at the Kennedy Space Center after 11 days in space delivering a major addition to the international space station and conducting three spacewalks to install it.

    The astronauts attached a 50-foot boom to the shuttle's robotic arm to inspect for any damage. The boom has a TV camera and a laser imagery system attached to its end. An identical survey was conducted on Day 2 of the mission.

    Monday's inspection was conducted while the shuttle was about 50 miles from the space station.

    If the astronauts had found the type of damage that could cause a deadly accident, the shuttle would have been able to return to the station. However, the space station had its own problems Monday.

    Space station crew members pulled an alarm and donned protective gear after smelling an oxygen generator overheated, spreading smoke and a burned-rubber smell and leaking an irritating chemical. NASA said the leak was not life-threatening, and the crew cleaned up the spill.

    The inspection of the shuttle two days before landing was one of several safety procedures instituted after the Columbia disaster in 2003. Foam that fell off the big external fuel tank during liftoff gashed Columbia's wing and caused the shuttle to disintegrate during re-entry into Earth's atmosphere. All seven astronauts were killed.

    NASA flight director Paul Dye said an initial look at the inspection footage from Atlantis showed no areas of concern with the ship's thermal protective skin.

    "We didn't see anything to the naked eye ... that would bother us," Dye said. "The only thing obvious was that everything looked very, very good."

    Even though Atlantis looked to be in good health, NASA probably won't give final approval to land the shuttle until Tuesday.

    The weather forecast for landing Wednesday in Florida wasn't promising but was expected to improve on Thursday and Friday. Atlantis has enough supplies to stay in space two extra days and could also land at Edwards Air Force Base in California.

    ___

    On the Net:

    NASA: http://www.nasa.gov

     

    Oriana Fallaci directs her fury toward Islam.





    THE AGITATOR
    by MARGARET TALBOT
    Oriana Fallaci directs her fury toward Islam.
    Issue of 2006-06-05
    Posted 2006-05-29

    “Yesterday, I was hysterical,” the Italian journalist and novelist Oriana Fallaci said. She was telling me a story about a local dog owner and the liberties he’d allowed his animal to take in front of Fallaci’s town house, on the Upper East Side. Big mistake. “I no longer have the energy to get really angry, like I used to,” she added. It called to mind what the journalist Robert Scheer said about Fallaci after interviewing her for Playboy, in 1981: “For the first time in my life, I found myself feeling sorry for the likes of Khomeini, Qaddafi, the Shah of Iran, and Kissinger—all of whom had been the objects of her wrath—the people she described as interviewing ‘with a thousand feelings of rage.’ ”

    For two decades, from the mid-nineteen-sixties to the mid-nineteen-eighties, Fallaci was one of the sharpest political interviewers in the world. Her subjects were among the world’s most powerful figures: Yasir Arafat, Golda Meir, Indira Gandhi, Haile Selassie, Deng Xiaoping. Henry Kissinger, who later wrote that his 1972 interview with her was “the single most disastrous conversation I have ever had with any member of the press,” said that he had been flattered into granting it by the company he’d be keeping as part of Fallaci’s “journalistic pantheon.” It was more like a collection of pelts: Fallaci never left her subjects unskinned.

    Fallaci’s manner of interviewing was deliberately unsettling: she approached each encounter with studied aggressiveness, made frequent nods to European existentialism (she often disarmed her subjects with bald questions about death, God, and pity), and displayed a sinuous, crafty intelligence. It didn’t hurt that she was petite and beautiful, with straight, smooth hair that she wore parted in the middle or in pigtails; melancholy blue-gray eyes, set off by eyeliner; a cigarette-cured voice; and an adorable Italian accent. During the Vietnam War, she was sometimes photographed in fatigues and a helmet; her rucksack bore handwritten instructions to return her body to the Italian Ambassador “if K.I.A.” In these images she looked as slight and vulnerable as a child. When she was shot, in 1968, while reporting on the student demonstrations in Mexico City, and then confined by the police with the wounded and the dying on one floor of an apartment building, the first impulse of the students around her was to protect her; one boy gave her his sweater, in order to cover her face from the drip of a sewage pipe. Her essential toughness never stopped taking people—men, especially—by surprise.

    Fallaci’s journalism, at first conducted for the Italian magazine L’Europeo and later published in translation throughout the world, was infused with a “mythic sense of political evil,” as the writer Vivian Gornick once put it—an almost adolescent aversion to power, which suited the temperament of the times. As Fallaci explained in her preface to “Interview with History,” a 1976 collection of Q. & A.s, “Whether it comes from a despotic sovereign or an elected president, from a murderous general or a beloved leader, I see power as an inhuman and hateful phenomenon. . . . I have always looked on disobedience toward the oppressive as the only way to use the miracle of having been born.” In Fallaci’s interview with Kissinger, she told him that he had become known as “Nixon’s mental wet nurse,” and lured him into boasting that Americans admired him because he “always acted alone”—like “the cowboy who leads the wagon train by riding ahead alone on his horse, the cowboy who rides all alone into the town.” Political cartoonists mercilessly lampooned this remark, and, according to Kissinger’s memoirs, the quote soured his relations with Nixon. (Kissinger claimed that she had taken his words out of context.) But the most remarkable moment in the interview came when Fallaci bluntly asked him, about Vietnam, “Don’t you find, Dr. Kissinger, that it’s been a useless war?,” and Kissinger began his reply with the words “On this, I can agree.”

    Fallaci’s interview with Khomeini, which appeared in the Times on October 7, 1979, soon after the Iranian revolution, was the most exhilarating example of her pugilistic approach. Fallaci had travelled to Qum to try to secure an interview with Khomeini, and she waited ten days before he received her. She had followed instructions from the new Islamist regime, and arrived at the Ayatollah’s home barefoot and wrapped in a chador. Almost immediately, she unleashed a barrage of questions about the closing of opposition newspapers, the treatment of Iran’s Kurdish minority, and the summary executions performed by the new regime. When Khomeini defended these practices, noting that some of the people killed had been brutal servants of the Shah, Fallaci demanded, “Is it right to shoot the poor prostitute or a woman who is unfaithful to her husband, or a man who loves another man?” The Ayatollah answered with a pair of remorseless metaphors. “If your finger suffers from gangrene, what do you do? Do you let the whole hand, and then the body, become filled with gangrene, or do you cut the finger off? What brings corruption to an entire country and its people must be pulled up like the weeds that infest a field of wheat.”

    Fallaci continued posing indignant questions about the treatment of women in the new Islamic state. Why, she asked, did Khomeini compel women to “hide themselves, all bundled up,” when they had proved their equal stature by helping to bring about the Islamic revolution? Khomeini replied that the women who “contributed to the revolution were, and are, women with the Islamic dress”; they weren’t women like Fallaci, who “go around all uncovered, dragging behind them a tail of men.” A few minutes later, Fallaci asked a more insolent question: “How do you swim in a chador?” Khomeini snapped, “Our customs are none of your business. If you do not like Islamic dress you are not obliged to wear it. Because Islamic dress is for good and proper young women.” Fallaci saw an opening, and charged in. “That’s very kind of you, Imam. And since you said so, I’m going to take off this stupid, medieval rag right now.” She yanked off her chador.

    In a recent e-mail, Fallaci said of Khomeini, “At that point, it was he who acted offended. He got up like a cat, as agile as a cat, an agility I would never expect in a man as old as he was, and he left me. In fact, I had to wait for twenty-four hours (or forty-eight?) to see him again and conclude the interview.” When Khomeini let her return, his son Ahmed gave Fallaci some advice: his father was still very angry, so she’d better not even mention the word “chador.” Fallaci turned the tape recorder back on and immediately revisited the subject. “First he looked at me in astonishment,” she said. “Total astonishment. Then his lips moved in a shadow of a smile. Then the shadow of a smile became a real smile. And finally it became a laugh. He laughed, yes. And, when the interview was over, Ahmed whispered to me, ‘Believe me, I never saw my father laugh. I think you are the only person in this world who made him laugh.’ ”

    Fallaci recalled that she found Khomeini intelligent, and “the most handsome old man I had ever met in my life. He resembled the ‘Moses’ sculpted by Michelangelo.” And, she said, Khomeini was “not a puppet like Arafat or Qaddafi or the many other dictators I met in the Islamic world. He was a sort of Pope, a sort of king—a real leader. And it did not take long to realize that in spite of his quiet appearance he represented the Robespierre or the Lenin of something which would go very far and would poison the world. People loved him too much. They saw in him another Prophet. Worse: a God.”

    Upon leaving Khomeini’s house after her first interview, Fallaci was besieged by Iranians who wanted to touch her because she’d been in the Ayatollah’s presence. “The sleeves of my shirt were all torn off, my slacks, too,” she recalled. “My arms were full of bruises, and hands, too. Do believe me: everything started with Khomeini. Without Khomeini, we would not be where we are. What a pity that, when pregnant with him, his mother did not choose to have an abortion.”


    Today, Fallaci believes, the Western world is in danger of being engulfed by radical Islam. Since September 11, 2001, she has written three short, angry books advancing this argument. Two of them, “The Rage and the Pride” and “The Force of Reason,” have been translated into idiosyncratic English by Fallaci herself. (She has had difficult relationships with translators in the past.) A third, “The Apocalypse,” was recently published in Europe, in a volume that also includes a lengthy self-interview. She writes that Muslim immigration is turning Europe into “a colony of Islam,” an abject place that she calls “Eurabia,” which will soon “end up with minarets in place of the bell-towers, with the burka in place of the mini-skirt.” Fallaci argues that Islam has always had designs on Europe, invoking the siege of Constantinople in the seventh century, and the brutal incursions of the Ottoman Empire in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries. She contends that contemporary immigration from Muslim countries to Europe amounts to the same thing—invasion—only this time with “children and boats” instead of “troops and cannons.” And, as Fallaci sees it, the “art of invading and conquering and subjugating” is “the only art at which the sons of Allah have always excelled.” Italy, unlike America, has never been a melting pot, or a “mosaic of diversities glued together by a citizenship. Because our cultural identity has been well defined for thousands of years we cannot bear a migratory wave of people who have nothing to do with us . . . who, on the contrary, aim to absorb us.” Muslim immigrants—with their burkas, their chadors, their separate schools—have no desire to assimilate, she believes. And European leaders, in their muddleheaded multiculturalism, have made absurd accommodations to them: allowing Muslim women to be photographed for identity documents with their heads covered; looking the other way when Muslim men violate the law by taking multiple wives or defend the abuse of women on supposedly Islamic grounds. (European governments are, in fact, hardening on these matters: France recently deported a Muslim cleric in Lyons who advocated wife-beating and the stoning of adulterous women.)

    According to Fallaci, Europeans, particularly those on the political left, subject people who criticize Muslim customs to a double standard. “If you speak your mind on the Vatican, on the Catholic Church, on the Pope, on the Virgin Mary or Jesus or the saints, nobody touches your ‘right of thought and expression.’ But if you do the same with Islam, the Koran, the Prophet Muhammad, some son of Allah, you are called a xenophobic blasphemer who has committed an act of racial discrimination. If you kick the ass of a Chinese or an Eskimo or a Norwegian who has hissed at you an obscenity, nothing happens. On the contrary, you get a ‘Well done, good for you.’ But if under the same circumstances you kick the ass of an Algerian or a Moroccan or a Nigerian or a Sudanese, you get lynched.” The rhetoric of Fallaci’s trilogy is intentionally intemperate and frequently offensive: in the first volume, she writes that Muslims “breed like rats”; in the second, she writes that this statement was “a little brutal” but “indisputably accurate.” She ascribes behavior to bloodlines—Spain, she writes, has been overly acquiescent to Muslim immigrants because “too many Spaniards still have the Koran in the blood”—and her political views are often expressed in the language of disgust. Images of soiling recur in the books: at one point in “The Rage and the Pride” she complains about Somali Muslims leaving “yellow streaks of urine that profaned the millenary marbles of the Baptistery” in Florence. “Good Heavens!” she writes. “They really take long shots, these sons of Allah! How could they succeed in hitting so well that target protected by a balcony and more than two yards distant from their urinary apparatus?” Six pages later, she describes urine streaks in the Piazza San Marco, in Venice, and wonders if Muslim men will one day “shit in the Sistine Chapel.”

    These books have brought Fallaci, who will turn seventy-seven later this month, and who has had cancer for more than a decade, to a strange place in her life. Much of the Italian intelligentsia now shuns her. (The German press has been highly critical, too.) A 2003 article in the left-wing newspaper La Repubblica called her “ignorantissima,” an “exhibitionist posing as the Joan of Arc of the West.” A fashionable gallery in Milan recently showed a large portrait of her—beheaded. After the Italian newspaper Corriere della Sera published the long article that became “The Rage and the Pride,” La Repubblica ran a reply from Umberto Eco, which did not mention Fallaci by name but denounced cultural chauvinism and called for tolerance. “We are a pluralistic society because we permit mosques to be built in our own home, and we cannot give this up just because in Kabul they put evangelical Christians in jail,” he wrote. “If we did, we would become Taliban ourselves.”

    Fallaci has repeatedly fallen afoul of some of Europe’s strict laws against vilifying religions or inciting racial hatred. (In Europe, the prevailing impulse toward certain kinds of outré opinions is to ban their expression.) In 2002, a French group, Movement Against Racism and for Friendship Between Peoples, tried unsuccessfully to get “The Rage and the Pride” banned. The following year, Swiss officials, under pressure from Muslim groups in that country, asked that she be extradited for trial; the Italian Minister of Justice refused the request. And she currently faces trial in Italy, on charges that amount to blasphemy, of all things. Last year, Adel Smith, a convert to Islam who heads a group called the Muslim Union of Italy, and who had previously sued the government to have a crucifix removed from his sons’ classroom, persuaded a judge in Bergamo to allow him to charge Fallaci with defaming Islam. A Mussolini-era criminal code holds that “whoever offends the state’s religion, by defaming those who profess it, will be punished with up to two years of imprisonment.” Though the code was written to protect the Catholic Church, it has been successively amended in the past ten years, so that it encompasses any “religion acknowledged by the state.” The complaint against Fallaci marks the first time that the code has been invoked on behalf of any religion but Catholicism. (In January, Fallaci’s supporters in the Italian Senate pushed through an amendment to the code, reducing the maximum penalty to five thousand euros.)

    Yet Fallaci’s recent books, and the specious trial that she is facing as a result—her books may offend, but it is no less offensive to prosecute her for them—have also made her a beloved figure to many Europeans. The books have been best-sellers in Italy; together they have sold four million copies. To her admirers, she is an aging Cassandra, summoning her strength for one final prophecy. In September, she had a private audience with Pope Benedict XVI at Castel Gandolfo, his summer residence outside Rome. She had criticized John Paul II for making overtures to Muslims, and for not condemning terrorism heartily enough, but she has hopes for Joseph Ratzinger. (The meeting was something of a scandal in Italy, since Fallaci has always said that she is an atheist; more recently, she has called herself a “Christian atheist,” out of respect for Italy’s Catholic tradition.) Last December, the Italian government presented her with a gold medal for “cultural achievement.”

    Fallaci’s arguments appeal to many Europeans on a visceral level. The murder of the Dutch filmmaker Theo van Gogh, the “honor killings” of young women in England and Sweden, and the controversy in France over whether girls may wear head scarves to school have underscored the enormous clash in values between secular Europeans and fundamentalist Muslim immigrants. In Holland, immigration officials have begun showing potential immigrants films and brochures that detail certain “European” values, including equality of the sexes and tolerance of homosexuality. The implicit suggestion is that in order to live in Europe you must accept these ideas. Such clumsy efforts betray the frustration and confusion that many Europeans have felt since the riots that broke out in the suburbs of Paris last fall—perhaps the most spectacular sign that the assimilation of Western Europe’s fifteen million Muslims has stalled in many places, and never started in others.

    Some European intellectuals have given Fallaci credit for offering an enraged, articulate voice to people who are genuinely bewildered and dismayed by the challenges of assimilating Islamic immigrants. In 2002, writing in the Italian weekly Panorama, Lucia Annunziata, a former foreign correspondent and columnist, and Carlo Rossella, then the magazine’s editor, argued that “The Rage and the Pride” had “redefined Italy’s conception of the current conflict between the Western world and the Islamic world. . . . Oriana Fallaci has confronted the issue with ironclad simplicity: We are different, she has said. And, at this point, we are incompatible.” The French philosopher Alain Finkielkraut, writing in Le Point, said that Fallaci “went too far,” reducing all “Sons of Allah to their worst elements,” yet he commended her for taking “the discourse and the actions of our adversaries” at their word and—in the wake of September 11th, the execution of Daniel Pearl, the destruction of Buddhas in Afghanistan, and other atrocities committed in the name of Islam—not being intimidated by the “penitential narcissism that makes the West guilty of even that which victimizes it.”

    Last year, a support committee for Fallaci collected some letters that it had received from people across Italy and presented them as a testimonial to her. A Florentine couple wrote, “Brava, Oriana. You had the courage and the pride to speak in the name of most Italians (who are perhaps too silent) who still have not sold out the social, moral, and religious values that belong to us. . . . If [immigrants] do not share our ideas, then why do they come to Italy? Why should we endure arrogance and interference by those who have no desire to integrate into our system and who are darkened by anti-Western hatred? We welcome them as guests, but immediately they act like the owners.” Another fan wrote, “In this tragic and historic moment, only one voice has been raised high to speak for the conscience of most Westerners. . . . That is why we are impotently witnessing the breakdown and decline of a civilization whose values are now ridiculed by those who are in charge of protecting them. . . . Thank you, Oriana.”


    Fallaci owns an apartment in Florence and has an estate in the Tuscan countryside. But she spends most of the year in New York, where she leads a fairly solitary life and, necessarily, spends a lot of time visiting doctors. In November, when she delivered an acceptance speech for an award given by the conservative Center for the Study of Popular Culture, it was a rare public appearance.

    “Darling,” she growled over the phone the first time we spoke, “as you well know, I never give interviews.” Strictly speaking, this isn’t true. Over the years, she’s given many of them, sometimes with embarrassing results—in Scheer’s 1981 Playboy interview, she complained about homosexuals who “swagger and strut and wag their tails” and “fat” women reporters who didn’t like her. When I visited her on a rainy Saturday afternoon in April, and again the next day, I found her voluble and dramatic, capable of leaping to her feet to illustrate a point, and shouting when she felt the point warranted it—which was often. She smoked little brown Nat Sherman cigarettes; smoking, she believes, “disinfects” her.

    Fallaci’s New York residence is a handsome nineteenth-century brownstone, painted white, with a walled garden in the back. She had longed for such a house since childhood; as a young girl in Italy during the Second World War, she’d found a Collier’s magazine in a care package dropped by U.S. military pilots, and fallen in love with a photo essay about American houses. “It’s funny to say that, with the marvellous architecture we have in Italy, I desired a house like this,” she said. “I grew up with this obsession of a white house with a black door.” Inside, the second-floor rooms, where we talked, had a scholarly, slightly worn elegance. The bookshelves held translations of Fallaci’s books and leather-bound early editions of Dickens, Voltaire, and Shakespeare. There were eighteenth- and nineteenth-century oil paintings on the walls; an old-fashioned cream-colored dial phone sat on a small table with a stained-glass lamp. It was the sort of setting where you could imagine retired professors sipping port and sparring genially over Greek participles. It was not the sort of setting where you expected to find a woman of Fallaci’s age yelling “Mamma mia! ” and threatening to break various people’s heads and blow things up.

    We sat down next to a table piled with newspaper clippings from Italy, which chronicled Fallaci’s anti-Islamic crusade: articles by her and articles about her, often on the front page. The Italian press is, as she puts it, “ob-sess-ed” with her. One article, “Reading Oriana in Tehran,” which had run in La Stampa, claimed that Fallaci was a legend among independent-minded women in Iran. “That’s damn good!” she said. Fallaci’s earlier books are widely available in Iran, but the trilogy has been banned. “You know what these women did?” she said. “They got copies in English and in French, and they photocopied them, chapter by chapter, and distributed them to others. They can go to jail for that.” The reporter for La Stampa had mainly found women who admired Fallaci for her earlier work: two female university students noted that Fallaci had been equally tough on the Shah and on Khomeini, and that she’d shown up to get her Iranian visa wearing nail polish and jeans.

    On the day I visited, Fallaci was dressed like a refined European lady: tweed skirt, leaf-green sweater, handsome antique jewelry, suède pumps. She wore her hair tied neatly at the nape of her neck rather than long and loose, as she used to, but she still looked beautiful—she has a perfect oval face and robust cheekbones. She put on a pair of jewel-rimmed reading glasses as she brandished another clipping, and said with satisfaction, “Ah, this is the scandal!” The conservative newspaper Libero had campaigned, unsuccessfully, for Fallaci to be made a Senator for Life, an honor conferred by the Italian President. According to the paper, the outgoing President, Carlo Azeglio Ciampi, had considered giving Fallaci the title, but lost his nerve. “To me, in a sense, it was a relief,” Fallaci said. “I didn’t want to be Senator for Life, and stay in Rome. I would not know where to sit.” She hopped up to demonstrate, pointing to the left and the right sides of an imaginary aisle—she belonged to no political side. Nevertheless, with evident delight, she noted that Ciampi’s “wife was infuriated at him” for the decision. “For some time, she didn’t speak to him. Three days after Christmas, she managed to have me receive a bouquet of white flowers. That was cute.”

    I visited Fallaci on the day before the Italian election, in which Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi was defeated by the center-left candidate, Romano Prodi. Fallaci told me that she had not sent in an absentee ballot. She loved referenda: “Do you want the hunter to go hunting under your window? No! Do you want the Koran in your schools? No!” “No” was something Fallaci was happy to say. But Berlusconi and Prodi were “two fucking idiots,” she said. “Why do the people humiliate themselves by voting? I didn’t vote. No! Because I have dignity. . . . If, at a certain moment, I had closed my nose and voted for one of them, I would spit on my own face.”

    Many of the clippings on Fallaci’s table focussed on Adel Smith’s lawsuit against her. She said that she would not attend the trial, which is scheduled for later this month. Although she is no longer at risk of incarceration, she invoked the possibility. “Because, you know, I am a danger to myself if I get angry,” she said. “If they were thinking to give me three years in jail, I will say or do something for which they give me nine years! I am capable of everything if I get angry.”


    I’d always thought of Fallaci as an icon of the nineteen-sixties—one of those women who had lived an emancipated life without ever calling herself a feminist, an insouciant heroine out of “The Golden Notebook” or “Bonjour Tristesse.” She denigrated marriage, got thrown out of nice restaurants for wearing slacks, and hung out with Anna Magnani and Ingrid Bergman. Her autobiographical novel “Letter to a Child Never Born” (1975) was a free woman’s despairing confession of ambivalence about bearing a child. “A Man” (1979) was a fictional tribute to her great love, the Greek resistance fighter Alexandros Panagoulis, who died in a suspicious automobile accident in Athens three years after they met. Panagoulis had been imprisoned, and endured torture, for his failed attempt on the life of the Greek junta leader George Papadopoulos, in 1968. “I didn’t want to kill a man,” he told Fallaci in an interview. “I’m not capable of killing a man. I wanted to kill a tyrant.” As a political prisoner, Panagoulis was defiant toward his captors and wrote poetry in his own blood; Fallaci considered him a model of what it is to be a man. I thought of her as a product of that heady time when big and bloody political matters were still at stake in Europe (dictators ruled Spain, Portugal, and Greece), but small, sophisticated cultural rebellions (movies, hair styles, poetic manifestos) made life chic and interesting. There’s some truth to this image, but Fallaci’s sensibility is a product less of the sixties than of the forties, and the struggle against Fascism in the Second World War.

    Fallaci was born in Florence in 1929, to a family with a long history of rebellion. Her mother, Tosca, she said, was the orphaned daughter of an anarchist—“and I tell you those were people with balls! With balls! And they were the first ones to be executed.” On both sides of her family, she said, she had relatives who fought for the Risorgimento—“people who were always in jail.” Fallaci was an avid reader as a child (her parents lived modestly but splurged on books), and a favorite author was Jack London. His tales of brave acts in the face of savage nature inspired her to become a writer. She describes her father, Edoardo—a craftsman who became a leader in the anti-Fascist movement in Tuscany, and who served time in prison for it—as a sweet man. “Heroes can be sweet,” she said, adding that Panagoulis had been that way, too. But both of Fallaci’s parents prized courage and toughness in their three daughters. In “The Rage and the Pride,” she tells a story about the Allied bombardment of Florence on September 25, 1943. She and her family took refuge in a church as the bombs began to fall. The walls were shaking—the priest cried out, “Help us, Jesus!”—and Oriana, who was the eldest, at fourteen, began to cry. “In a silent, composed way, mind you,” she writes. “No moans, no hiccups. But Father noticed it all the same, and, in order to help me, to calm me down, poor Father, he did the wrong thing. He gave me a powerful slap—he stared me in the eyes and said, ‘A girl does not, must not, cry.’ ” Fallaci says that she’s never cried since—not even when Panagoulis died.

    As a teen-ager, Fallaci did clandestine work for the anti-Fascist underground—she had her own nom de guerre, Emilia, and she carried explosives and delivered messages. After Italy surrendered, in September, 1943, and American and British prisoners began escaping from prison camps, one of her tasks was to accompany them “past the lines” and to safe refuge. Fallaci was chosen because she wore her hair in pigtails and looked deceptively innocent. “It was so scary, because there were minefields, and you never knew where the mines were,” she recalled. “When my mother read that in a book later, she said, to my father, ‘You would have sacrificed newly born children! You and your ideas.’ And then she said, ‘Well, but I had a feeling you were doing something like that.’ ”

    Fallaci’s parents looked upon the Americans as their particular friends, and when she was in high school they insisted that she learn English when her classmates were studying French. It was the beginning of a lifelong affinity for America, even when, as during the Vietnam War, she was sharply critical of its policies. “In my old age, I have been thinking about this, and I have reached the conclusion that those who have physical courage also have moral courage,” she said. “Physical courage is a great test.” She added, “I know I have courage. But I’m not alone. My sister Neera was like me. And my second sister, Paola, too. It came from the education my parents gave us.”

    She proudly told a story about her mother, which, like other recollections, sounded as if it might have been polished over time. “When my father was arrested, we didn’t know where they had him, so she went everywhere for two days and finally she found him, at the house of torture. It was called Villa Triste. They killed people there. And the Fascist major was named Mario Carità—Major Charity. Mother—I don’t know how she did it—she went to the office of Major Charity, passing a room that was full of blood on the floor, the blood of three men who had been arrested and tied together, and one of them was my father. Carità says, ‘Madam. I have no time to lose. Your husband will be executed tomorrow morning at six. You can dress in black.’ My mother got up—and I always imagine the scene this way, as if she were the Statue of Liberty—and my mother said, ‘Mario Carità, tomorrow morning I shall dress in black, like you said. But if you are born from the womb of a woman, ask your mother to do the same, because your day will come very soon.’ You could think for a year before you came up with something like that—to her, it came.” Her mother was pregnant at the time, Fallaci went on. “She mounted on her bicycle, and all at once she had pains so terrible. She entered into a beautiful building and, in the atrium, she lost the child. She put it in, I don’t know, a handkerchief or something. She mounted the bicycle again. She rode home. I opened the door, and there was mother, as pale as snow. And before she entered she said, ‘Father will be executed tomorrow morning at six, and Elena’—that was the name she had given the baby—‘is dead.’ No tears.” In the end, Edoardo Fallaci was spared, though he spent additional time in jail. Fallaci’s sister Neera became a writer, and died of cancer; Paola is a perfectionist gardener—imagine a cross between Martha Stewart and Oriana—who raises prize-quality chickens on Fallaci’s property in rural Tuscany.

    Fallaci sees the threat of Islamic fundamentalism as a revival of the Fascism that she and her sisters grew up fighting. She told me, “I am convinced that the situation is politically substantially the same as in 1938, with the pact in Munich, when England and France did not understand a thing. With the Muslims, we have done the same thing.” She elaborated, in an e-mail, “Look at the Muslims: in Europe they go on with their chadors and their burkas and their djellabahs. They go on with the habits preached by the Koran, they go on with mistreating their wives and daughters. They refuse our culture, in short, and try to impose their culture, or so-called culture, on us. . . . I reject them, and this is not only my duty toward my culture. Toward my values, my principles, my civilization. It is not only my duty toward my Christian roots. It is my duty toward freedom and toward the freedom fighter I am since I was a little girl fighting as a partisan against Nazi-Fascism. Islamism is the new Nazi-Fascism. With Nazi-Fascism, no compromise is possible. No hypocritical tolerance. And those who do not understand this simple reality are feeding the suicide of the West.”

    Fallaci refuses to recognize the limitations of this metaphor—say, the fact that Muslim immigration is not the same as an annexation by another state. And although European countries should indeed refuse to countenance certain cultural practices—polygamy, “honor killings,” and anti-Semitic teachings, for example—Fallaci tends to portray the worst practices of Islamic fundamentalists as representative of all Muslims. Certainly, European countries have made some foolish compromises in the name of placating Muslim residents. In Germany, where courts have ordered that Muslim religious instruction be offered in schools, just as Christian instruction is, critics have complained that the Islamic teaching often perpetuates a conservative version of Islam. The result, the historian Bernard Lewis argued, in a recent talk in Washington, is that “Islam as taught in Turkish schools is a sort of modernized, semi-secularized version of Islam, and Islam as taught in German schools is the full Wahhabi blast.” (This is a good reminder of why the American model of keeping religious instruction out of public schools facilitates assimilation.) Many of Fallaci’s objections, however, have more to do with her aesthetic sensibilities. For her, hearing Muslim prayers in Tuscany—she does her own wailing imitation—is a form of oppression. Yet such examples do not rise to the level of argument that she wants to make, which is that the native culture of Italy will collapse if Muslims keep immigrating.

    “They live at our expense, because they’ve got schools, hospitals, everything,” she said at one point, beginning to shout. “And they want to build damn mosques everywhere.” She spoke of a new mosque and Islamic center planned for Colle di Val d’Elsa, near Siena. She vowed that it would not remain standing. “If I’m alive, I will go to my friends in Carrara—you know, where there is the marble. They are all anarchists. With them, I take the explosives. I make you juuump in the air. I blow it up! With the anarchists of Carrara. I do not want to see this mosque—it’s very near my house in Tuscany. I do not want to see a twenty-four-metre minaret in the landscape of Giotto. When I cannot even wear a cross or carry a Bible in their country! So I BLOW IT UP! ”


    The magnificently rebellious Oriana Fallaci now cultivates, it seems, the prejudices of the petite bourgeoisie. She is opposed to abortion, unless she “were raped and made pregnant by a bin Laden or a Zarqawi.” She is fiercely opposed to gay marriage (“In the same way that the Muslims would like us all to become Muslims, they would like us all to become homosexuals”), and suspicious of immigration in general. The demonstrations by immigrants in the United States these past few months “disgust” her, especially when protesters displayed the Mexican flag. “I don’t love the Mexicans,” Fallaci said, invoking her nasty treatment at the hands of Mexican police in 1968. “If you hold a gun and say, ‘Choose who is worse between the Muslims and the Mexicans,’ I have a moment of hesitation. Then I choose the Muslims, because they have broken my balls.”

    In “The Rage and the Pride,” Fallaci portrays the attacks of September 11th as a thunderclap that woke her from a quiet, novel-writing existence and transformed her, almost unwillingly, into an anti-Islamic rebel. But Fallaci’s distaste for Islam goes way back. Reasonable worries about the rise of Muslim fundamentalism were combined with a visceral revulsion and the need for a new enemy, in the post-Fascist, post-Communist world. Her interviews with Yasir Arafat (whom she loathed), Qaddafi (whom she also loathed), and even Muhammad Ali (whom she walked out on, she says, after he belched in her face) all fuelled her antipathy toward the Muslim world. So did her experiences in Beirut during its disintegration, in the nineteen-eighties—the basis for her 1990 novel, “Inshallah.”

    I started wondering if Fallaci would tolerate any Muslim immigration, or any mosque in Europe, so I asked her these questions by e-mail, and she sent back lengthy replies. “The tolerance level was already surpassed fifteen or twenty years ago,” she wrote, “when the Left let the Muslims disembark on our coasts by the thousands. And it is well known . . . that I do not accept the mendacity of the so-called Moderate Islam. I do not believe that a Good Islam and a Bad Islam exist. Only Islam exists. And Islam is the Koran. And the Koran says what it says. Whatever its version. Of course there are exceptions. Also, considering the mathematical calculation of probabilities, some good Muslims must exist. I mean Muslims who appreciate freedom and democracy and secularism. But, as I say in the ‘Apocalypse,’ . . . good Muslims are few. So tragically few, in fact, that they must go around with bodyguards.” (Here she mentioned Ayaan Hirsi Ali, the Somali-born former member of the Dutch parliament, whom Holland, shamefully, declared last month that it would strip of her citizenship, citing an irregularity in her 1997 asylum application.) She wrote that she found my question about whether she would tolerate any mosques in Europe “insidious” and “offensive,” because it “aims to portray me as the bloodthirsty fanatics, who during the French Revolution beheaded even the statues of the Holy Virgin and of Jesus Christ and the Saints. Or as the equally bloodthirsty fanatics of the Bolshevik Revolution, who burned the icons and executed the clergymen and used the churches as warehouses. Really, no honest person can suggest that my ideas belong to that kind of people. I am known for a life spent in the struggle for freedom, and freedom includes the freedom of religion. But the struggle for freedom does not include the submission to a religion which, like the Muslim religion, wants to annihilate other religions. Which wants to impose its ‘Mein Kampf,’ its Koran, on the whole planet. Which has done so for one thousand and four hundred years. That is, since its birth. Which, unlike any other religion, slaughters and decapitates or enslaves all those who live differently.”


    My second meeting with Fallaci was a less inflammatory encounter. She is an excellent cook, and she made us lunch—cotechino sausage, polenta, mashed potatoes, and delicious little tarts with pine nuts and dried fruit—and served champagne. I’d never seen anyone approach certain kitchen tasks with such ferocity. “I must CRUSH the potatoes,” she declared. At one point, we spoke about populist leaders in Latin America, and the political left’s romance with them over the years; I mentioned Hugo Chávez, the President of Venezuela. “Mamma mia! Mamma mia! ” Fallaci shouted from the kitchen. “Listen,” she said more calmly. “You cannot govern, you cannot administrate, with an ignoramus.” When I left, she insisted on giving me a bag of chestnut flour and dictating a recipe for a dessert that she says children love. “If you make a mistake, you spoil everything,” she instructed, adding, “Get the good olive oil—not the kind they do in New Jersey.”

    Fallaci was wearing a sweater and a skirt again that day. Late in life, she realized that skirts are more comfortable than the pants she had favored as a young woman. Besides, she wore pants when other women didn’t because she was “a person who had always gone against the current,” certainly since she started her writing career, at age sixteen, as a beat reporter for a Florentine newspaper. Now that everybody wore pants, what was the point? She had some evening dresses upstairs, relics from a brief period in her early thirties when she’d been a little less serious. But now they felt to her “like monuments”; where would she wear them? We talked about the historical novel that she had set aside after September 11th, when “this Islam business kidnapped me,” her regrets that she’s never had children, and her long illness. One of her doctors, she said, had asked her recently, “Why are you still alive?” Fallaci responded, “Dottore, don’t do that to me. Someday I break your head.” She added, “Another day, I smiled and said, ‘You tell me—you are the doctor.’ See, I got offended. ‘I don’t want to come here to hear about my death. Your duty is to speak to me about life, to keep me alive.’ ”

    She surprised me with a charming story about being a young writer in New York in the nineteen-sixties. At the time, she recalled, she’d had a chance to interview Greta Garbo—a mutual friend wanted to set it up. But Fallaci admired Garbo’s fierce and elegant privacy, and didn’t want to pursue the matter. And then one winter evening Fallaci was shopping at the Dover Delicatessen, on Fifty-seventh Street, and Garbo happened to be there: “You couldn’t not recognize her. She was Greta Garbo. She was dressed like Greta Garbo—with the hair, the glasses. And she was choosing chicken with extreme care. She would look at a leg and toss it back, then the breast, and so on. And I felt ashamed of myself that I was observing her. I went in the other aisle, and I remember I got a lot of things, because I wanted her to go out and not go by me.” It was a rainy night and Fallaci had no umbrella. She recalled that Garbo, on her way out the door, stopped and held it open. “She said, ‘Here, Miss Fallaci.’ I looked like a poor, pitiful bird.” They walked together, under Garbo’s umbrella, to the corner of Third Avenue, and Fallaci—in a rare moment of restraint—barely said a word.

    After I had interviewed Fallaci, I discovered two great examples of her journalism that I had not read before. In a witty 1963 article about Federico Fellini, Fallaci describes with wary, nervy thoroughness the many times and places that the great director kept her waiting. When she finally corners him, she begins by saying, “So then let us brace ourselves, Signor Fellini, and let us discuss Federico Fellini, just for a change. I know you find it hard: you are so withdrawing, so secretive, so modest. But it is our duty to discuss him, for the sake of the nation.” She goes on in this vein until Fellini cuts her off, saying, “Nasty liar. Rude little bitch.” In her introduction to the interview, she writes, “I used to be truly fond of Federico Fellini. Since our tragic encounter, I’m a lot less fond. To be exact, I’m no longer fond of him. That is, I don’t like him at all. Glory is a heavy burden, a murdering poison, and to bear it is an art. And to have that art is rare.” Equally absorbing, in a different way, was the section of her 1969 book, “Nothing, and So Be It,” in which she describes the events of October, 1968, in Mexico City, when soldiers shot and bayonetted hundreds of anti-government protesters. Fallaci was detained with a group of students, and was ultimately shot three times. “In war, you’ve really got a chance sometimes, but here we had none,” she writes. “The wall they’d put us up against was a place of execution; if you moved the police would execute you, if you didn’t move the soldiers would kill you, and for many nights afterward I was to have this nightmare, the nightmare of a scorpion surrounded by fire, unable even to try to jump through the fire because if it did so it would be pierced through.” Dragged down the stairs by her hair and left for dead, Fallaci was ultimately taken to a hospital, where she underwent surgery to remove the bullets. One of the doctors who cared for her came close and murmured, “Write all you’ve seen. Write it!” She did, becoming a crucial witness to a massacre that the Mexican government denied for years.

    These pieces showed Fallaci in her prime. In her e-mail, however, she told me that she didn’t really remember the interview with Fellini—only that she didn’t like him. And her memories of Mexico City in 1968 had largely devolved into a dislike of Mexicans. Fallaci’s virtues are the virtues that shine most brightly in stark circumstances: the ferocious courage, and the willingness to say anything, that can amount to a life force. But Fallaci never convinced me that Europe’s encounter with immigration is that sort of circumstance.

    Not that it would matter to her. “You’ve got to get old, because you have nothing to lose,” she said over lunch that afternoon. “You have this respectability that is given to you, more or less. But you don’t give a damn. It is the ne plus ultra of freedom. And things that I didn’t used to say before—you know, there is in each of us a form of timidity, of cautiousness—now I open my big mouth. I say, ‘What are you going to do to me? You go fuck yourself—I say what I want.’ ”


    September 05

    Nicotene Madness

    Nicotine Madness
    The stupid drug story of the week.
    By Jack Shafer
    Updated Friday, Sept. 1, 2006, at 5:24 PM ET

    Journalists give tobacco companies the same benefit of the doubt they do alleged baby-rapists, which is to say none. And who can blame them? For a century, the tobacco industry has lied and obfuscated about their products at every turn.

    Yet serial liars aren't automatically guilty of every charge leveled against them. Even the tobacco company baddies, who took a wicked beating this week in the press, deserve a fair hearing before we hang them.

    The news hook this week was a Commonwealth of Massachusetts report about nicotine yields in cigarettes increasing by 10 percent since 1998. The Boston Globe's headline reports "Cigarettes pack more nicotine," and the story's lede alleges that the boost makes "it tougher for smokers to quit." The story quotes Massachusetts officials, anti-smoking advocates from public health and law, but no critics of the report. The tobacco companies declined, across the board, to talk to the press.

    The Washington Post story, titled "Nicotine up Sharply in Many Cigarettes," states that "the higher levels theoretically could make new smokers more easily addicted and make it harder for established smokers to quit." Only slightly more skeptical than the Globe, the closest the story comes to finding a critic of the report is a University of California at San Francisco physician who says, "I don't think we know what the consequences are for the population in terms of addictive behavior and how hard it is for people to quit."

    The New York Times headlines its story from the Associated Press "Nicotine Levels Rose 10 Percent in Last Six Years, Report Says." The lede sources to the report the observation that the increase makes "it harder to quit and easier to be addicted." No critics are quoted. CBS News and ABC News broadcasts take the same tack as the newspapers, quoting public-health officials and other anti-tobacconists complaining about the dangers of increased nicotine. The New York Times editorial, "Raising Nicotine, on the Sly," deduces from the report that tobacco companies are "sneakily making cigarettes more addictive."

    That every form of tobaccocigarettes, cigars, pipes, chew, snuff, "light" cigarettesis injurious to health is a given. If you want to live a long, healthful life, you should avoid tobacco; if you currently partake of the weed, you should quit. But the shoddy 15-page Massachusetts report (PDF) and the lazy news stories it generated forgo science for alarmist public-health propaganda. Hate the tobacco industry as much as you want, but not over this.

    Cigarette testing has long been controversial. In the late 1960s, the Federal Trade Commission ordered tobacco companies to report tar and nicotine yields in cigarettes. It hoped that armed with data, smokers would steer away from high-tar cigarettes on the assumption that they were more dangerous than low-tar smokes. The FTC reported (PDF) results from the tests from 1968 through 1998.

    If you click here, you'll see that tar and nicotine yields dropped steadily from 1968 to 1998. (The FTC weighted its final tar and nicotine results by sales of specific brands to better reflect the actual overall consumption in the market by smokers.)

    The FTC still collects cigarette emissions data but stopped reporting it to the public in the late 1990s because of a variety of real criticisms. For one, researchers contended that FTC-approved smoking machines did not accurately mimic the way humans smoke cigarettes, making the "nicotine yields" invalid. For another, the tobacco industry was cravenly exploiting the FTC reports, as internal documents from tobacco giant BAT cited in a recent Lancet article show. The Lancet authors found that BAT deliberately developed "cigarettes that produced low yields under standard testing protocols, whereas in consumers' hands they elicited more intensive smoking and provided higher concentrations of tar and nicotine to smokers." BAT also ignored ethical questions raised by its senior scientists, the article reports.

    The Lancet authors continue:

    Despite the risk to consumers, BAT pursued this product strategy and paired it with an equally successful marketing campaign that promoted these cigarettes as low-tar alternatives for health-concerned smokers. BAT was aware of the duplicitous nature of this strategy and set a policy to suppress outside knowledge of their research on smoking behaviour.

    BAT and the industry wanted to preserve the FTC method for measuring emissions for as long as possible because the figures created the illusions that 1) cigarettes were getting safer because tar and nicotine yields were falling; and 2) the government was somehow endorsing low-tar cigarettes as the healthy alternative to high-tar cigarettes.

    Massachusetts law, however, required the tobacco companies to continue reporting emission data and specifies a different method of measurement than the FTC's. (The Massachusetts method is described on Page 3 of the report.)

    How much of an improvement is the Massachusetts method? Not much, judging from "Cigarette Yields and Human Exposure: A Comparison of Alternative Testing Regimens," published in the August 2006 issue of Cancer Epidemiology Biomarkers & Prevention. No matter how clever the design, a smoking machine can't smoke cigarettes the way people do because it doesn't smoke them for the same reason: People smoke cigarettes for the drug effect, namely the nicotine, and devise individual strategies for extracting the nicotine dose they desire. Or, as the Lancet article puts it, "Smokers compensate for low-yield cigarettes by smoking them more intensely, to the extent that the machine-tested tar and nicotine levels currently bear little or no relation to the actual levels of tar and nicotine delivered to smokers."

    The "Cigarette Yields" article further warns that the machines don't produce measures of human exposure and "tell us nothing about human uptake of smoke constituents." So, feel free to dump from your brain all the scary news coverage about today's cigarettes being automatically more addictive.

    I became suspicious of the Massachusetts report after reading an insightful post in the Aug. 30 Knight Science Journalism Tracker about the press coverage the study was getting. (I recommend the KSJ Tracker to all skeptical journalists, whether they cover science or not.) Writer Boyce Rensberger* notes that the press was making a big deal about average nicotine yield growing 10 percent between 1998 and 2004. But there was no "smooth upward trend," he writes. Nicotine yield dropped in 1999, 2002, and 2003.

    If tobacco companies are consciously boosting nicotine yields, by what strange logic would they also trim them some years? Could it be that 1) the methodology behind the Massachusetts results isn't consistent; or 2) the mix of cigarette brands tested changes sufficiently from year to year to alter average nicotine yields?

    The tobacco industry knows that tobacco consumers adapt their smoking techniques to extract the dose of nicotine they crave. If that's the case, what incentive do they have to boost nicotine yields? Wouldn't it be in their interests to produce low-nicotine cigarettes in hopes that smokers purchase and consume more of them in their pursuit of nicotine?

    The text from the Massachusetts report contradicts the idea that tobacco companies need to increase nicotine yield to hook customers. Page 10 states, "The results tests [sic] performed in accordance with [Massachusetts Department of Public Health] regulations demonstrates the highly addictive potential of nearly all brands of cigaretteswhether full flavor, 'light,' or 'ultra-light.' "

    I ran the 15-page Massachusetts report past David Hammond, the lead author in both the Lancet and Cancer Epidemiology Biomarkers & Prevention articles, for his appraisal, and I'm pleased to publish his 1,000-word rebuke as a sidebar.

    In it, he writes:

    We should not interpret a 20% reduction in nicotine emissions as a decrease in addictive potential; thus, we should not interpret cigarettes with a 20% increase as more addictive. Any suggestion that the brands in 2005 are more addictive than the 1998 studies would require much more evidence than the changes in emission levels depicted in the report. Indeed, I would not argue that the modern cigarette is any less addictive than the 1950's cigarette despite the fact they cigarettes in the 1950's had many more times the nicotine emission levels than current brands. Cigarettes remain both incredibly addictive and lethal, and the modest changes in emission levels do nothing to alter this basic fact.

    By taking Massachusetts' cue and obsessing on the nicotine yields, the press inadvertently promoted lower-nicotine blends as somehow less addictive and more safe when no "safer" or "less addictive" cigarette exists.

    With enemies like Massachusetts and the press, the tobacco industry doesn't need friends.

    ******

    When nonsmokers like me look in the mirror, we say, "I can't wait until tomorrow because I get better looking every day." Light me up with your e-mail: slate.pressbox@gmail.com. (E-mail may be quoted by name unless the writer stipulates otherwise. Permanent disclosure: Slate is owned by the Washington Post Co.)

    Shafer's hand-built RSS feed.

    Correction, Sept. 5: The original version of this story misidentified the author of the Knight Science Journalism Tracker item about nicotine yield. It was Boyce Rensberger, substituting for Charles Petit. (Return to the corrected sentence.)


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    SALES WEIGHTED "TAR" AND NICOTINE YIELDS PER CIGARETTE (1968-1995)

    YEAR TAR (mg.) NICOTINE (mg.)
    1968 21.6 1.35
    1969 20.7 1.38
    1970 20.0 1.31
    1971 20.2 1.32
    1972 19.9 1.39
    1973 19.3 1.32
    1974 18.4 1.24
    1975 18.6 1.21
    1976 18.1 1.16
    1977 16.8 1.12
    1978 16.1 1.11
    1979 15.1 1.07
    1980 14.1 1.04
    1981 13.2 0.92
    1982 13.5 0.89
    1983 13.4 0.88
    1984 13.0 0.89
    1985 13.0 0.95
    1986 13.4 0.93
    1987 13.3 0.94
    1988 13.3 0.94
    1989 13.1 0.96
    1990 12.5 0.93
    1991 12.6 0.94
    1992 12.4 0.92
    1993 12.4 0.90
    1994 12.1 0.90
    1995 12.0 0.87
    1996 12.0 0.88
    1997 12.0 0.89
    1998 12.0 0.88

    Source: PDF Page 12 of the 2000 FTC report, " 'Tar,' Nicotine, and Carbon Monoxide of the Smoke of 1,294 Varieties of Domestic Cigarettes for the Year 1998."



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    David Hammond, assistant professor of health studies and gerontology at the University of Waterloo, assesses the Massachusetts report on nicotine yields (PDF). He writes:

    1. I am somewhat dismayed by the language used in the report. The first bulleted point in the report states that, "the total amount of nicotine delivered to the smoker has increased significantly." This is factually incorrect. The report did not measure nicotine delivery to smokers. This involves measuring biomarkers of uptake in a biosample such as urine, blood, or saliva. The most fundamental point that should be made in the report or in any media coverage is that cigarette yields regardless of whether they are tested using the FTC, Massachusetts, or Canadian testing methodsare NOT associated with human exposure or delivery. (Note: I have attached a paper that was published this past month and makes this point directly with regards to the Massachusetts method.) [Emphasis by the author.]

    In the background information on page 6, the report makes another inaccurate statement: "Nicotine yield is a measure of the amount of nicotine in the smoke that a smoker inhales." This is simply incorrect. Smokers of the same product inhale significantly different amounts of nicotine from the same cigarettes. This has been demonstrated over and over, including in population-based studies.

    To be fair, the report certainly makes an attempt to present the relevant context on emissions. However, the misleading terms used in the executive summary and elsewhere get the fundamental point wrong and only perpetuate the misconception that the emission levels from machine smoking are associated with human exposure. If nothing else, the report is an excellent illustration of the confusion on this fundamental issue, even among well-intentioned and progressive tobacco control agencies. It is no surprise, therefore, that many consumers continue to believe that "lower tar" cigarettes are also reduced exposure/risk products.

    2. The report indicates that, "The MDPH [Massachusetts Department of Public Health] testing method better simulates the smoking behavior of the typical smoker under typical smoking conditions." Unfortunately, this isn't entirely the case. It is true that the MDPH method provides more intense measures of smoking behaviour, but it does not "mimic" human smoking behaviour. The most fundamental aspect of human smoking behaviour is that it is compensatory. In other words, humans adjust the intensity of their smoking in response to the cigarette design and emission level. Therefore, "lower nicotine" yield cigarettes are smoked systematically more intensely. The MDPH testing method is no better at "mimicking" this aspect of human smoking than the FTC method.

    3. In my view, perhaps the most important point to communicate is the following: "For all brands tested in both 1998 and 2004, there were no significant differences in the total nicotine content between 'full flavor,' 'medium,' 'mild,' 'light,' or 'ultra-light' cigarettes." Cigarettes have been designed to be "elastic" or "compensatible," and there is more than enough nicotine available in any of the products to promote and sustain addiction. Moreover, the modern cigarette has been designed to present the smoke to consumers in a palatable manner that minimizes the irritation and unpleasantness of inhaling smoke. In this sense, the modern cigarette design is no less harmful or less addictive than brands from 50 years ago, and perhaps even more so.

    4. The primary design feature used to reduce emissions under the FTC and the MDPH method is filter ventilation. The report notes the range in filter ventilation levels, which appeal to different segments of the market, and appear to give smokers a "choice" or range of nicotine and tar levels. This range helps to reinforce the misconception that switching to "lower emission" products confers some advantage. As indicated above, smokers compensate for more highly ventilated cigarettes. In some cases, smokers cover the vent holes either intentionally or unintentionally, although the most common means of compensation is simply to change the intensity of puffing behaviour. (The report only mentions vent-hole blocking, which is an oversight.)

    5. The terms "light", "ultra-light" etc, are merely brand descriptors that are decided upon by manufacturers. There is a strong association between the tar/nicotine emissions and the descriptors (i.e. "ultra light" brands typically have lower tar and nicotine emissions), but they are arbitrary marketing descriptors. Although there are conventions for classifying the tar emission levels of different descriptors, there is no "official" categorization and the same categories do not necessarily apply in different markets. (i.e. an "ultra-light" cigarette in China, may have a similar tar level as a "light" or even a full flavour brand. There are also examples of this happening within a market.)

    6. The current recommendation from the WHO and other expert panels is not to communicate emission information directly to consumers, regardless of the testing method. Emission information can help scientists and regulators to learn about product design, but it is useless to the individual consumer. Expert groups also recommend removing the deceptive "light/mild" descriptors. The European Union has already banned these descriptors, as have other countries.

    7. Why have the MDPH emissions increased? I'm not sure. Without the data it's hard to get a sense of brand specific changes and general market trends. Some of the increases would suggest design changes, although many of the differences appear to be relatively modest. At first blush, the changes don't appear to signal any significant change in cigarette design across the market, but I really couldn't say based on the report summary.

    8. So, in conclusion, is the increase in MDPH nicotine emissions worrisome? Not beyond the fact that it illustrates that manufacturers continue to manipulate emissions levels to appeal to different market segments and to ensure that cigarettes are as appealing to consumers as possible. We should not interpret a 10% reduction in nicotine emissions as a decrease in addictive potential; thus, we should not interpret cigarettes with a 10% increase as more addictive. Any suggestion that the brands in 2005 are more addictive than the 1998 studies would require much more evidence than the changes in emission levels depicted in the report. Indeed, I would not argue that the modern cigarette is any less addictive than the 1950's cigarette despite the fact they cigarettes in the 1950's had many more times the nicotine emission levels than current brands. Cigarettes remain both incredibly addictive and lethal, and manufacturers have designed cigarettes to produce deceptively low nicotine readings on the standard test while delivering more than enough nicotine to create and sustain addiction. The MDPH report makes this important point, although regulators and the public health community must be cautious about placing too much important on changes in emission levels without corresponding data on human patterns of use and actual measures of exposure.

    Jack Shafer is Slate's editor at large.

    Today"s Papers

    Today"s Papers

    Woe is the GOP
    By M.J. Smith
    Posted Sunday, Sept. 3, 2006, at 6:34 AM ET

    The papers' front pages are devoid of breaking news on this sleepy holiday weekend. The New York Times leads with a U.N. report on a sharp increase in opium production in Afghanistan because of the Taliban's resurgence, a story the other papers barely note. The Washington Post goes with a piece detailing education experts' calls for national school-testing standards, while the Los Angeles Times puts an update on GOP woes ahead of upcoming congressional elections in the lead spot.

    The NYT's opium story is based on an analysis from the U.N.'s Office on Drugs and Crime that says there has been a 49 percent increase in the opium crop from last year. The increases have come mostly in the south, the paper says, where Taliban rebels, who benefit from opium sales, have reasserted themselves and pushed farmers to grow poppy in exchange for protection. The Times also quotes the director of the U.N. office saying the Taliban may be using a provocation strategy, hoping the Afghan government will react somehow to the increase in cultivation and anger residents by doing so.

    The numbers are impressivea record crop of 6,100 metric tons of opium, accounting for 92 percent of global supplybut how the United Nations comes up with these figures is a bit hazy. The NYT says investigators use satellite imagery and "teams on the ground, who have even worked in Taliban-controlled areas." Interviews are also conducted with farmers. Seems, at best, to be experienced guesswork.

    The WP uses wire copy for its opium coverage, and the LAT dispenses with it with a brief.

    According to the WP, education experts say some states are dumbing down student test standards and that a nationwide measurement should be put in place. This, of course, has little chance of actually happening, the story notes, but, hey, it's a slow news day.

    Nevertheless, the examples the story gives are telling. Maryland says that 82 percent of its fourth-graders are proficient or better in reading, while the National Assessment of Educational Progress shows only 32 percent at that level. In Virginia, the state claims 86 percent, while the NAEP says 37 percent. One possible solution, the story notes, is for Washington to finance a voluntary national testing program, which would be more palatable politically.

    The LAT's lead spells out trouble for Republicans, as do similar stories fronted by the NYT and WP. Republican candidates are in some cases doing what they can to distance themselves from President Bush, while Democrats plan to pound the economy and rely on a general feeling of pessimism among voters. That may be a good idea, considering, as the LAT points out, their position on Iraq is um, what is their position again?

    The papers agree that the House will be easier for Democrats to take control of than the Senate, but they warn not to underestimate Republicans' turnout capabilities and their willingness to spend plenty dough as the campaign intensifies. But even Republican strategists sound defeatist, with two telling the WP it seems likely the House will change hands.

    Meanwhile, Karl Rove doesn't have the sway he once did over his fellow Republicans in this year's campaign, the NYT reports.

    The LAT fronts and the other papers stuff word that four soldiers accused of murdering three detainees in Iraq could face the death penalty if convicted. Investigators allege the men killed the Iraqis then attempted to cover it up by concocting a story that the detainees tried to escape. A lawyer for the soldiers says one of them was cut with a knife and another was hit by the Iraqis. Investigators are also looking into whether Col. Michael Steele, commander of the soldiers' brigade, encouraged unnecessary violence, the LAT reports. Steele, who the paper notes was featured in Black Hawk Down, says he did nothing wrong.

    The papers also weigh in with Sept. 11 anniversary stories, with the NYT fronting a feature on 9/11 widows and widowers who are also illegal immigrants. They've collected between $875,000 and $4.1 million as compensation for the deaths of their wives or husbands, but they live shadowy lives, afraid they and their children will be deported if they keep too high a profile.

    In another Sept. 11-related story, the NYT takes a look at the continued follies of the Transportation Security Administration, which has decided to suspend installations of the so-called "puffer," a device designed to detect residue from explosives on would-be airplane passengers. Apparently, the machines have broken down frequently and don't do much to detect liquid explosives.

    The WP looks at the government's hardball tactics in prosecuting potential terrorists in its Sept. 11 piece, questioning whether some suspects have been unfairly targeted, while the LAT updates the FBI's continued search for Adnan Gulshair Muhammad el Shukrijumah, the former South Florida resident now suspected of being a major player in the terrorist world.

    The LAT reports on the drought from Texas, where farmers are selling off cattle because all grass has dried up and they can't afford to feed them.

    And, in a solid piece, the NYT looks at the pluses and minuses of a new trend in parenting: using a form of in vitro fertilization to ensure babies are born without gene defects that make them susceptible to cancer. While the procedure offers parents the potential to keep their kids from suffering later in life, ethicists wonder whether it will lead to a greater health divide among the rich and poor. There's also the worrying prospect of babies being selected based on factors that have nothing to do with health, such as their gender or sexual preference, the story notes.

    M.J. Smith is a writer based in Paris.